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Abstract: Sailors were praised as much as hoplites in democratic Athens. In the eyes of the dēmos 
fighting at sea was no less of a benefit than doing so on land. They believed that a citizen equally met 
his martial duty by serving as a sailor or a hoplite. Non-elite citizens insisted that Athenians fighting 
sea battles be equally recognised for their courage. All this differed from the negative view of sailors 
that elite citizens had held in archaic times. In the military realm the dēmos had thus successfully 
redefined traditional aristocratic values.    
 
Keywords: Athenian democracy, classical Athens, military history, sailors and hoplites.   
 
Résumé: Dans l’Athènes démocratique, les marins étaient tout aussi importants culturellement que 
les hoplites. En effet, il était clair pour le dēmos que son État était une importante puissance maritime. 
Athènes était consciente qu’il était crucial de préserver ses forces navales, puisqu’elle menait avant 
tout ses combats en mer. Pour le peuple, combattre en tant que marin profitait autant à l’État que le 
faire en tant qu’hoplite, et les Athéniens n’appartenant pas à l’élite étaient convaincus qu’un citoyen 
honorait de la même manière ses devoirs en servant dans la marine ou dans l’armée de terre. Il leur 
tenait donc à cœur que les Athéniens combattant en mer obtiennent la même reconnaissance de leur 
bravoure. Traditionnellement, l’aretē était définie en fonction de ce que les hoplites devaient 
accomplir en se battant sur terre. Cependant, la manière de combattre des marins était nettement 
différente. Par conséquent, les reconnaître comme courageux posait un problème, puisqu’ils ne 
répondaient pas strictement à la définition de l’aretē telle qu’elle était appliquée aux hoplites. Les 
orateurs publics et les dramaturges identifièrent deux manières de contourner ce problème: parfois, 
ils mettaient en exergue les aspects des combats en mer par lesquels les marins répondaient aux 
critères traditionnels du courage, ou tout au moins s’en approchaient. Plus souvent encore, ils 
utilisaient tout simplement une nouvelle définition de l’aretē, considérant que le courage consistait à 
braver les dangers du champ de bataille malgré les risques. Puisque cette nouvelle définition n’était 
plus liée aux hoplites, elle pouvait facilement s’appliquer aux marins. Tout cela différait grandement 
de la vision négative des marins que les Athéniens classiques avaient héritée de leurs ancêtres, et c’est 
ainsi que le dēmos est parvenu à redéfinir les valeurs aristocratiques traditionnelles dans le domaine 
militaire.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
 Ancient historians regularly argue that the Athenian dēmos (“people”) held sailors 
in much lower esteem than hoplites. They cite in support of this the extant funeral 
speech of Pericles. Certainly this famous speech said a lot about courageous hoplites 
but next to nothing about sailors. Yet it is also clear that this was not a typical example 
of the genre. Funeral speeches usually gave a fulsome account of Athenian military 
history. In 431/0 BC Pericles decided to skip such an account because of the difficult 
politics that he faced. In rehearsing military history funeral speeches always mentioned 
naval battles and recognised sailors as courageous. Old comedy and the other genres 
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of public oratory depicted sailors in the same positive terms. Their sailors displayed no 
less courage than hoplites and both groups equally benefitted the state. All these non-
elite genres assumed that a citizen fulfilled his martial duty by serving as either a sailor 
or a hoplite. They used a new definition of courage that both groups of combatants 
could easily meet. In tragedy, by contrast, characters and choruses used the hoplite 
extensively as a norm. In epic poetry heroes spoke in the same hoplitic idiom. By 
copying this idiom the tragic poets were setting their plays more convincingly in the 
distant heroic age. In spite of this, tragedy still recognised Athens as a major seapower 
and could depict sailors as courageous. In Athenian democracy speakers and 
playwrights had to articulate the viewpoint of non-elite citizens. Their works put 
beyond doubt that the dēmos esteemed sailors as highly as hoplites.  
 
2. A Striking Paradox  
 
Typically historians of classical Athens argue that sailors were less prominent 
culturally than hoplites. This would be a paradox because this state’s military power 
primarily came from a huge navy.1 This paradox is usually attributed to the low 
standing of naval personnel. The common view is that the Athenian dēmos viewed 
sailors as inferior to hoplites.2 As a result – it is argued – the Athenians preferred to 
use this heavily armed soldier as a norm in public discourse.3 Public speakers and 
playwrights regularly reflected on the relationship that different social groups had to 
war. In doing so some of them did focus on the hoplite. The discursive use of this 
soldier could lead to defining aretē (“courage”) in terms of what hoplites had to do for 
victory. Certainly courage was so defined by the tragic poets. For them a courageous 
man primarily had to remain (menō) “by his spear” (Eur. El. 388–90) or “beside his 
shield” (Phoen. 1003). While cowards ran away (e.g. Eur. HF 158–61), the brave man 
did not “flee from the spear” (Aesch. Pers. 1025), but accepted the risk of “the spear’s 
sudden wound” (Eur. HF 162–4). This steadfastness was a precondition for winning a 
land battle.4 In the front ranks hoplites took comfort from knowing that others could 
relieve them. With a mass of hoplites standing behind them, they could not easily run 
away.   
                                                          
1
 E.g. Cartledge 1998, p. 64–5; Strauss 1996, p. 313–14, 320; 2000, p. 261–2.  
2
 E.g. Bourriot 1972, p. 25–7, 30; Cartledge 1998, p. 64–5; Christ 2006, p. 2 n. 2; Crowley 
2012, p. 100–4; Loraux 1995, p. 27, 254 n. 34; Raaflaub 1994, p. 138–9, 141–2; 1996, p. 154–9; 
Spence 1993, p. 164–9; Strauss 1996, p. 321–2; van Wees 2004, p. 47, 200–1, 211.   
3
 E.g. Bourriot 1972, p. 30; Christ 2006, p. 2; Crowley 2012, p. 104; 2014, p. 112; Hanson 1996, 
p. 296; Roubineau 2015, p. 53–4; Trundle 2010, p. 141.   
4
 Pritchard 2010, p.17–19.  
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 In order to be victorious each front-rank hoplite also had to keep on striking until 
his opposite number fell or fled.5 Therefore tragedy made “great exploits” a secondary 
requirement for a brave man.6 Obviously the way in which sailors fought was really 
different.7 In sea battles they could not act individually because their ship was a 
collective weapon (e.g Xen. Oec. 8.8). Significantly they employed flight as a tactic.8 
Consequently sailors could not strictly meet a hoplite-based definition of aretē. It is 
often argued that this resulted in the dēmos questioning their courageousness.9  
 The classic study of the standing of sailors in ancient Greece is by F. Bourriot. 
Bourriot puts beyond doubt that rating sailors below soldiers was common before 
Athenian democracy.10 In epic poetry the elite heavily armed soldier clearly was the 
masculine norm.11 Often Homer represented the relationship of each social group to 
war by depicting how this soldier interacted with his father or wife.12 In his poems 
aretē consisted of what society expected such elite figures to do in land battles.13 Only 
they were depicted as fighting courageously.14 Certainly they never fought sea battles.15 
“The Greeks”, Bourriot writes, “who disembarked at Troy had not encountered any 
squadron that tried to oppose their armada nor to sink their heavily laden ships.”16 
Homer did not think favourably either of the non-elite sailors on these ships; for he 
regularly depicted them displaying cowardice or other moral shortcomings.17   
 The heavily armed soldier also served as the norm on the pots of sixth-century 
Athens.18 Athenians who purchased them clearly wanted to think about war in the same 
hoplite-centred terms. A good example is the common painting of divination before a 
soldier’s departure (figure 1).19 In this scene the hoplite studies most closely the viscera 
because he is the one who is about to risk his life in war. The old man, who is next to 
                                                          
5
 Pritchard 2013, p. 183–4.  
6
 E.g. Soph. Aj. 424-40, 443, 468, 1239–40, 1300; Ant. 194–7.  
7
 Pritchard 2013, p. 207–8.  
8
 E.g. Hdt. 9.11; Thuc. 1.49.5, 50.3; 2.84.4, 90.5–6, 91.1–92.2; 8.104–5.   
9
 E.g. Arrington 2015, p. 103–4; Cartledge 1998, p. 63; Crowley 2012, p.103; Spence 1993, p. 
167–9.  
10
 Bourriot 1972, p. 11–19.    
11
 Redfield 1975, p. 109–111.   
12
 E.g. Hom. Il. 4.310–25; 5.470–92, 682–88; 6.440–94; 7.79–81.  
13
 Loraux 1995, p. 75-87; Payen 2018, p. 52–5.   
14
 E.g. Hom. Il. 2.200–2; 5.529–33; 6.112, 265; 6.522; 11.287; 12.310–28; 19.35; Od. 12.211; 
Balot 2014, p. 179–80, 198–203; Pritchard 2013, p. 198–200; Raaflaub 1996, p. 146.   
15
 Morrison and Williams 1968, p.43–66.  
16
 Bourriot 1972, p. 12.  
17
 E.g. Hom. Od. 1.304; 4.374; 10.34–47, 78–9, 198–202, 266–74, 453–4, 485–6, 566–8; 
12.201–5, 223–5; Bourriot 1972, p. 19 n. 42.  
18
 Cartledge 1998, p. 62–3; Lissarrague 1989, p. 44–5, 48; 1990, p. 138, 234–7; Roubineau 
2015, p. 51–3.  
19
 Lissarrague 1990, p. 55–69.  
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him, may no longer be a hoplite. But he once was and so can give advice to the younger 
man. When a female relative is depicted, she stands passively. She leaves the 
discussion of war to men who wage war.  
 
[Use a full page to place figure 1 here, with the photograph cropped above and below 
the patterns around the painting.]  
 
Figure 1: A hoplite looks for portents about his departure in organs of a sacrificed 
animal, while his father, his wife and a Scythian archer look on. Attic red-figure 
amphora, c. 500 BC, attributed to the Nikoxenos Painter. Paris, Louvre Museum, inv. 
no. G46. © RMN–Grand Palais (Louvre Museum). Photograph: Hervé Lewandowski.  
 
In classical Athens sailors had the opportunity to change this traditional rating of 
their military service. Under Athenian democracy the main fora for developing the 
popular culture that the dēmos shared were the theatre, the assembly and the law-courts. 
Playwrights, politicians and litigants may have belonged to the elite.20 But their 
audiences were predominantly non-elite citizens.21 Formally ten judges voted on who 
would win the dramatic agōnes (“contests”).22 But they took their cue from the noisy 
responses that the thousands of theatregoers made to each play.23 This meant that 
playwrights needed to reproduce the perceptions of non-elite theatregoers.24   
Politicians and litigants were under still more pressure to articulate this non-elite 
viewpoint because the outcomes of their debates and trials came down to the actual 
votes of their audiences.25 In 432/1 only one third of Athenians fought in the land 
army.26 The other two thirds regularly served in the navy. Consequently there would 
have been large numbers of sailors in the theatre, the assembly and the law-courts. It 
would be a striking paradox if such audience-members could not “stamp their image 
on Athenian public culture”.27 This would confirm the commonly made argument that 
the dēmos never redefined the aristocratic values that they had inherited.28 It would 
                                                          
20
 Pritchard 2013, p. 9–18.  
21
 For theatregoers see e.g. Orfanos 2014, p. 216, 218; Roselli 2011, p. 117–67. For 
assemblygoers and jurors see e.g. Canevaro 2016, p. 42–57; Hansen 1991, p.127–78, 183–6.  
22
 Csapo and Slater 1994, p. 157–65.  
23
 E.g. Dem. 18.265; 19.33; 21.226; Pl. Resp. 492a; Leg. 659a; Robson 2016, p. 78–9; Wallace 
1997, p. 98–106.     
24
 E.g. Arist. Poet. 1453a; Pol. 1341b10–20; Pl. Leg. 659a–c, 700a–1b. 
25
 E.g. Arist. Rh. 1.9.30–1; 2.21.15–16; 2.22.3; Pl. Resp. 493d.  
26
 Pritchard 2019, p. [insert pg. nos.].   
27
 Strauss 1996, p. 321.  
28
 E.g. Coin-Longeray 2014, p. 57; Jacquemin 2013, p. 10, 13; Loraux 1986, p. 217; Raaflaub 
1996, p. 158.  
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support the bold claim of N. Loraux that “democracy never acquired a language of its 
own”.29  
 That sailors continued to be discredited in Athenian democracy may be the 
predominant view. But this view has always faced challenges. Seventy years ago 
Ehrenberg argued that in the wake of the Persian Wars “the navy claimed for itself 
military valour and virtue”.30 For Ehrenberg the Athenians thus appreciated the 
“military virtue” of their sailors. More recently J. Roisman writes that for fourth-
century orators the hoplite was an important norm.31 But Roisman cautions that the 
“oratorical corpus provides no evidence for the inferior ranking of rowing in 
comparison to hoplite or cavalry service”.32 Balot, among others, has likewise argued 
that the classical Athenians viewed sailors as just as courageous as hoplites.33  
 
3. The Funeral Oration  
 
The funeral oration is vitally important for studying the rating of sailors. 
Admittedly funeral orators were not competing for the support of audience-members. 
Their performance-context was thus different from what playwrights and other public 
speakers faced.34 Nevertheless the democratic council still chose funeral orators from 
among the leading politicians.35 They were required to deliver praise that met the 
expectations of a large crowd.36 Such constraints probably encouraged them to 
articulate no less the non-elite viewpoint. Parallels between their speeches and the 
genres that were part of democratic agōnes confirm that they did.37 It was a 
commonplace of the funeral oration that the focus was on the war dead being buried.38 
The mourners, however, clearly expected the genre’s praise to go well beyond them.39 
Plato’s Socrates notes, correctly, how the speakers “praise the state by all means, those 
who died in war, our ancestors, indeed all those who went before as well us who are 
still alive”.40 Indeed funeral speeches offered the fullest account of military history that 
                                                          
29
 Loraux 1986, p. 334.  
30
 Ehrenberg 1951, p. 300–1. The first edition of this book was published in 1943.  
31
 Roisman 2005, p. 106–9.  
32
 Roisman 2005, p.127 n. 69.  
33
 Balot 2014, p. 179–99; Ober 2010, p. 81; Pritchard 1998, p. 53–6.  
34
 Blanshard 2010, p. 205–7.  
35
 E.g. Dem. 18.285; Isoc. 4.74; Pl. Men. 234b, 235c; Thuc. 2.34.6; Hesk 2013, p. 61.   
36
 E.g. Dem. 60.1; Thuc. 2.34.6–7, 35.2–3, 36.1, 46.1; Grethlein 2010, p. 226.   
37
 Tragedy for one depicted Athenian warmaking in the same positive terms as the funeral 
oration (e.g. Mills 2010; Pry 2015).  
38
 E.g. Lys. 2.1–2; Pl. Menex. 236d–e; Thuc. 2.35.1–2. 
39
 E.g. Carey 2007, p. 242; Grethlein 2010, p. 224; Loraux 1986, p. 2, 37, 52.  
40
 Pl. Menex. 234c–5b; Loraux 1986, p. 264–6.  
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non-elite Athenians ever heard.41 If, then, the dēmos preferred to give less praise to 
sailors than hoplites, we would expect to find clear evidence in this genre.   
In her great study of the funeral oration Loraux claimed to have found this 
evidence. For Loraux this oration concealed the navy and always used the hoplite as 
the norm for aretē.42 Those who believe in the low rating of sailors have naturally 
seized on her claims.43 The funeral speech of 431/0 seems to bear out both claims. 
Pericles praised Athenian aretē in Thucydides 2.39. This chapter presented a long list 
of reasons why the Athenians were more courageous than the Spartans. One reason 
was that they relied on, not Sparta’s “preparations and tricks”, but an innate courage 
(Thuc. 2.39.1). This concealed the careful “preparation” before a fleet’s launch (e.g. 
Ar. Ach. 189–90, 530–54; Dem. 4.35-7). Another reason concerned the training of 
Spartan hoplites.44 Even though, Pericles said, the Athenians did none whatsoever, they 
were no less courageous (Thuc. 2.39.4). Here Pericles failed to mention the regular 
training that Athenian sailors undertook.45 Athenian hoplites were the only branch of 
the armed forces that did not train.46 In fact Pericles’s list is really only about Athenian 
hoplites. It seems that courage could be discussed only in terms of them.    
 For generations students have read this famous speech of Pericles. It is the best 
known of the genre’s five surviving examples.47 There is a temptation to take it as a 
typical funeral oration. Yet it was strikingly different from the two other examples to 
which it is closest in date.48 Lysias and Plato spent over half of theirs cataloguing 
exploits in mythical and historical times.49 Thucydides 2.36 was all that Pericles said 
about such exploits. In the fourth century this catalogue was the standard means for 
                                                          
41
 Pritchard 1996, p.138; 2010: 40.  
42
 E.g. Loraux 1986, p. 37, 151, 212, 278; 2018, p. 87.  
43
 E.g. Cartledge 1998, p. 62; Strauss 1996, p. 313–14, 321; 2000, p. 262, 264; cf. Raaflaub 
1996, p. 156, 158.  
44
 On the Spartan agōgē (“education”) of future hoplites see e.g. Ruzé and Christien 2017, p. 
112–27.   
45
 E.g. Plut. Vit. Cim. 11.2–3; [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.19–20; Thuc. 1.80, 142.6–9; 2.84–6, 89; Xen. 
Mem. 3.5.18; Morrison, Coates and Rankov 2000, p.115–17; Pritchard 1994, p. 129 n. 102.  
46
 For the training of the archer corps see e.g. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 42.3; Xen. Hell. 3.4.16; Pritchard 
2018a, p. 91, 97. For the cavalry corps see e.g. Xen. Eq. Mag. 1.5–6, 18, 21; 4.4; 8.1–8; Pritchard 
2018b, p. 409. For the lack of training for hoplite see e.g. Pritchard 2013, p. 159–60.   
47
 Shear 2013, p. 511; Todd 2007, p. 153.  
48
 Loraux 1986, p. 89; Todd 2007, p. 150-1, 153–4, 164.   
49
 Lys. 2.17–66; Pl. Menex. 239c–46a; Frangeskou 1999, p. 323.  
 Page 7 
 
praising the Athenians.50 Each military exploit revealed the same: the Athenians waged 
just wars and were always courageous.51  
 Herodotus 9.27 implies that such exploits were already standard in 431/0. At the 
battle of Plataea, fifty years earlier, a debate occurred about aretē on the Greek side 
(Hdt. 9.26–7). Herodotus’s chapter records, supposedly, what proofs the Athenians 
gave that they were more courageous. They spoke of four “ancient” exploits and the 
land battle of Marathon (27.2–5). Three of these exploits were standard myths in 
fourth-century funeral speeches.52 The funeral oration likewise drew the line between 
mythical and historical exploits at Marathon.53 Herodotus’s Athenians repeatedly 
fought alone (9.27.2, 5). Funeral speeches characterised them in the same way (e.g. 
Dem. 60.10; Lys. 2.13, 20–6). In the debate victory was credited only to the Athenians 
as a collective. Such anonymity was a commonplace at the public funeral.54 Therefore 
clear parallels existed between these two catalogues. Herodotus, it seems, who was 
writing in the 430s, drew on an epitaphic tradition that already included a stock 
catalogue of exploits.55 In Thucydides 2.36 Pericles gave an excuse for not speaking 
about the creation of the Athenian empire: he did not want to go through erga 
(“exploits”) that were well known (4). Other funeral orators used the same excuse for 
skipping exploits (Dem. 60.6; Hyp. 6.4–5; Pl. Menex. 239b). Pericles’s funeral speech 
thus implies as well that this catalogue was standard in 431/0.56    
Lysias and Plato show what kinds of historical erga were included. Their 
catalogues spent just as much time on sea battles as on land battles.57 Indeed Lysias’s 
account of Salamis was twice as long as what he said about Marathon.58 He made the 
Athenians who fought this naval battle surpass all others in aretē (Lys. 2.33, 40, 43). 
Plato praised the aretē of every Athenian who had fought in the Persian Wars (Menex. 
239d, 2401e–1a, 241d). He also introduced erga that Pericles could have used in an 
account of the empire’s creation. They were all naval campaigns: Eurymedon, Cyprus 
and Egypt (Pl. Menex. 241d–e; cf. Lys. 2.54–7). Plato praised no less the aretē of 
                                                          
50
 E.g. Arist. Rh. 2.22.6; Dem. 60.10; Isoc. 4.74; Carey 2007, p. 243; Grethlein 2010, p. 122–3; 
Loraux 1986, p. 155; Pritchard 1996, p. 144.  
51
 E.g. Grethlein 2010, p. 109, 111, 113, 116; Loraux 1986, p. 118, 132; Mills 1997, p. 50, 62; 
Pritchard 1996, p. 138.  
52
 E.g. Lys. 2.4–16; Pl. Menex. 239a–d; Pritchard 1996, p. 144–5.  
53
 Dem. 60.9; Lys. 2.20; Pl. Menex. 239b–40c.   
54
 Todd 2007, p. 150; Loraux 1986, p. 52; 2018, p. 75.  
55
 Mills 1997, p. 46-7; Todd 2007, p. 153.  
56
 Grethlein 2010, p. 122-3; Frangeskou 1999, p. 320 n. 23.   
57
 Pritchard 1998, p. 55.  
58
 Lysias 2.32–43; Frangeskou 1999, p. 323–4.   
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Athenian sailors in the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars (243a–d, 246a). In both 
speeches victories at sea benefitted Athens no less than those on land.59    
Bourriot, however, rightly reminds us of “the depth of the contempt” that Plato 
actually had for sailors.60 Plato saw them as generally immoral and the navy in which 
they served as a cause of moral corruption (e.g. Leg. 706b–e, 707a–c). Athenian 
intellectuals, clearly, who wrote only for elite readers, were able to keep alive the older 
negative view of sailors.61 In his Menexenus, though, Plato was parodying a non-elite 
genre. A parody works only if it contains a lot of what it is criticising. By giving sailors 
aretē, despite his low regard of them, Plato confirmed that this was one of the funeral 
oration’s commonplaces.62   
This genre generally did not conceal the Athenian navy. Loraux’s claim that it 
defined courage in hoplitic terms looks no more secure. In his funeral speech Lysias 
repeatedly characterised the Athenians as courageous (e.g. 2.5, 10, 14, 20, 23, 27, 43–
4, 62–3). His catalogue always described the same behaviour in battle: the Athenians 
bore kindunoi or dangers.63 In bearing them they accepted the risk of death (e.g. 12, 14, 
23, 25, 63). This catalogue suggests that a brave man simply takes on dangers in spite 
of the personal risk. In several chapters Lysias explicitly defined aretē in this way (e.g. 
12, 15, 20, 23, 25, 47, 63). The same definition is found in other funeral speeches (e.g. 
Thuc. 2.39.1, 4; 2.40.3–4). For Hyperides, for example, “those willing to run a risk 
with their bodies” exhibited aretē (6.15). This was a simplification of the traditional 
definition of courage in terms of the hoplite. Because this new definition was no longer 
linked to this soldier, sailors could meet it just as easily as hoplites.    
There are two plausible explanations why the funeral speech of 431/0 lacked 
martial erga. The first sees it as solely the work of Thucydides. In the catalogue of 
exploits Athens simply never changed: it always had been Greece’s leading power.64 
In book 1 Thucydides, indisputably, challenged this historical view.65 In mythical 
times, he argued, other leading powers had existed (1.2–18). Thucydides showed how 
Athens had become Greece’s leading power only after the Persian Wars (89–117). In 
book 2 he thus skipped the catalogue because its view of the past was what he had just 
challenged.66       
                                                          
59
 E.g. Lys. 2.44, 47, 54–60; Pl. Menex. 240a–2e.  
60
 Bourriot 1972, p. 36–7; Calame 1996, p. 426–7.     
61
 E.g. Isoc. 8.79; 12.115–16; Balot 2014, p. 186–7; Pritchard 2018a, p. 97.  
62
 For the value of his speech as such evidence see e.g. Carey 2007: p.242; Shear 2013, p. 512.  
63
 E.g. Lys. 2.3, 9, 12, 14–15, 20, 26, 33, 35, 40, 43, 47, 54; Arrington 2015, p. 107; Yoshitake 
2010, p. 375.  
64
 Loraux 1986, p. 132, 144, 292; Mills 1997, p. 50, 62.  
65
 Foster 2010, p. 8-43; Grethlein 2010, p. 209, 223–8; Loraux 1986, p. 64–5, 142, 291–2.    
66
 Pritchard 1996, p. 148 pace Shear 2013, p. 529.  
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The second explanation assumes that the speech is based on what Pericles said in 
431/0. Months earlier the dēmos accepted his policy of abandoning Attica in the face 
of Sparta’s expected invasion (Thuc.2.13–14). Opposing it would simply be too 
dangerous because Sparta’s coalition army would be several times larger. When, 
however, the Athenians saw their farms being pillaged, the hoplites among them 
demanded that they be led out to fight (21).67 Not doing so was now branded as 
cowardice (e.g. Plut. Vit. Per. 33.6). Pericles, according to Thucydides (2.22.1–2), 
managed their anger carefully. This careful management continued into his funeral 
speech. The catalogue included stock erga in which the Athenians defeated invaders 
who had much larger forces (e.g. Lys. 2.4–6, 11-17, 20–7). Rehearsing them now ran 
the risk of rekindling the anger against Pericles’s policy. Therefore Pericles skipped 
the catalogue and gave a list of reasons why Athenian hoplites could still feel braver 
than the invaders.68      
Either explanation plausibly accounts for this speech’s lack of a catalogue. If the 
majority view were that the speech was solely Thucydidean, it would be easy to choose 
the first. This, however, is not the case; for historians, now, are returning to Loraux’s 
view that a lot of this speech is Periclean.69 Today I would choose the second 
explanation because it explains more: both explanations account for no catalogue but 
only the second accounts for Thucydides 2.39.  
 
4. Old Comedy  
 
Old comedy used the hoplite as a norm in two different ways. We can see these 
uses clearly in the fantasies that Aristophanes wrote about ending the Peloponnesian 
War. In Acharnians Dicaeopolis expresses his war-weariness in terms of hoplites: the 
war’s outbreak is “the clash of shields” (539), while his desire for peace is for the 
Athenians “to hang up their shields” (539). In Lysistrata Aristophanes made the women 
similarly express their desire for peace: they wish to stop their husbands using against 
each other “shield”, “spear” or “sword” (49–53, 105–6, 556–60). This comedy also 
shows how the hoplite was employed on stage as the norm for defining gender roles.70 
In Lysistrata a magistrate claims that Attic women have no relationship to war (587–
8). Lysistrata replies that they certainly do because they “bear sons and send them out 
as hoplites”.71 Aristophanes made the hoplite a metonym for war the most in his 
                                                          
67
 Bosworth 2000, p. 7; Pritchard 2010, p. 21.  
68
 Bosworth 2000, p. 5–6, 10; Hesk 2013, p. 62; Shear 2013, p. 526.  
69
 E.g. Bosworth 2000, p. 16; Carey 2007, p. 242; Frangeskou 1999, p. 315; Hesk 2013, p. 51; 
Loraux 1986, p. 9, 70, 131, 191–2. Contra Grethlein 2010, p. 107.  
70
 Pritchard 1998, p. 47–8.   
71
  Ar. Lys. 588–90; cf. Thesm. 820–9; Thuc. 2.44.3–4; Pritchard 2014, p. 183.  
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Peace.72 This comedy’s chorus are sick and tired of going to the Lyceum “with spear, 
with shield” (352-7). Athenian hoplites frequently mustered on this athletics field 
before departing for a battle.73 Their response to the war’s fantastical ending is no less 
hoplitic: they rejoice at being freed from shields, helmets and the food-rations that 
hoplites had to bring with them on a campaign (312, 335–6, 1127–9, 1172–90).     
 Aristophanes may have used the hoplite as a norm for generalisations about war 
and gender-roles. But he never concealed that Athens was predominantly a naval 
power.74 In Acharnians Aristophanes had Dicaeopolis choose between different peace-
treaties (185–202). Dicaeopolis rejects the five-year one because it smells of pitch and 
the “preparation” of warships.75 Later he argues that Sparta was not solely to blame for 
the Peloponnesian War because it was responding to an Athenian trade-embargo 
against a Spartan ally (530–40). The Athenians, Dicaeopolis points out, would do the 
same; for, at the smallest provocation, they would prepare three-hundred triremes for 
launching.76 In Peace Aristophanes made Hermes explain that the Peloponnesian War 
broke out when Athens carried out such a launch (625–7). In Lysistrata the Spartan 
woman fears that the sex strike will not stop the war as long as there are Athenian 
triremes (173–4). Therefore these anti-war comedies fully acknowledged that Athens 
waged war primarily on the sea. In tune with this, Aristophanes generally depicted the 
maintenance of the Athenian navy as unambiguously good. Themistocles is thus 
praised for creating the Piraeus (Ar. Eq. 813–16), while regular shipbuilding and 
protecting the shipsheds are ideal public policies.77          
For Bourriot the dēmos were “proud of their harbours, their triremes and their 
dockyards”.78 Nevertheless Bourriot still claims that “this high regard did not extend 
down to the sailors”. The comedies of Aristophanes completely disprove his last claim. 
They repeatedly esteem sailors as highly as hoplites (e.g. Eq. 781–5). For Aristophanes 
the kindunoi that each group bore equally benefitted the state. He recognised the aretē 
of sailors no less than the funeral oration did. On stage his Athenians equally met their 
duty to fight for the state by serving as hoplites or sailors. In discussing this duty 
Aristophanes did not feel obliged to use the hoplite as a norm.   
                                                          
72
 Taillardat 1965, p. 367-8.  
73
 Pritchard 2018a, p. 91-2.  
74
 E.g. Ar. Av. 108, 143–5, 592–601, 710–11; Eq. 160–74; Pax 503–7; Pritchard 1998, p. 52.  
75
 Ar. Ach. 189–90. Pitch was used to waterproof trireme-hulls (e.g. [Dem.] 50.26; Blanshard 
2010, p. 220).  
76
 Ar. Ach. 541–5; Okál 1960, p. 103.   
77
 E.g. Ar. Ach. 920–5; Eq. 555, 1065–6, 1350-5, 1366–8.  
78
 Bourriot 1972, p. 29.    
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Aristophanes made sailors as courageous as soldiers in Knights of 425/4.79 This 
comedy’s chorus wish to praise (eulogēsthai) their courageous fathers, since “in land 
battles and in a fleet (en te naupharktōi stratōi) they were always victorious and 
adorned this state”.80 Here fighting at sea benefits Athens no less than doing so on land. 
Their fathers always won “because no one of them, when he saw the enemy, counted 
their number” (Ar. Eq. 569–70). In funeral speeches courageous Athenians likewise 
disregarded the enemy’s numbers.81 Rather, the chorus continue, “their thumos 
straightaway was on guard” (570). Athenian authors used thumos as a synonym for 
aretē.82 Consequently this passage is making sailors as courageous as soldiers. The 
chorus draw their eulogy to a close by describing the courage of their fathers (571–3). 
Here Aristophanes avoided a hoplite-based definition of aretē just as much as funeral 
orators did. In contrast to them, however, he did so with, not a simpler definition, but 
a sporting metaphor.83 The Athenians thought that athletes required the same virtues as 
combatants.84 Consequently they used the actions of one group to describe the other. 
“But if ever”, the chorus conclude, “they fell on their shoulder in battle, they would 
wipe clean this fall, deny that they had fallen and resume their wrestling-bout” (571–
3).    
In his Wasps Aristophanes depicted sailors benefitting the state as much as 
hoplites.85 This comedy is about a son’s efforts to get his father to retire from jury 
service. The son points out that their imperial subjects give the dēmos nothing, even 
though their service in the army and the navy created the empire (667–9). Instead the 
politicians get all the perks and the jurors only 3 obols (862–4). What makes it worse, 
he adds, is that the latter “acquired” the tribute that paid their jury pay “by bearing 
many ponoi (“toils”) while rowing, fighting infantry battles and besieging” (684–5). 
                                                          
79
 Butera 2010: 145–6.     
80
 Ar. Eq. 565–8; cf. IG i3 503/4.1–4. Classical-period authors often employed the phrase 
nautikos stratos (“naval force”) to describe a fleet (e.g. Aesch. Ag. 634; Hdt. 3.17, 19, 44; 4.87, 89; 
6.31, 62; Thuc. 7.70–1). They sometimes contrasted such a nautikos stratos with land forces (e.g. 
Hdt. 3.17; 4.167, 203; 6.45; 7.58; 8.60; Thuc. 6.97–100). This contrast shows that the phrase did not 
refer to a land army that was being transported by ship. In these lines Aristophanes used instead 
naupharktos stratos (“ship-fenced force”). Naupharktos is typical of poetry (Lech 2009, p. 21; 
Sommerstein 1981, p. 175). Aeschylus used this adjective to refer to the fleets that fought at Salamis 
(Pers. 950–2, 1029). Euripides employed naupharktos strateuma to describe a fleet (IA 1259–60). 
Strateuma and stratos could, of course, be used interchangeably (e.g. Hdt. 3.150). Therefore, 
naupharktos appears to be a tragic synonym for nautikos. All this suggests that the en te naupharktōi 
stratōi of Ar. Eq. 567 is best translated as “in a fleet”.   
81
 E.g. Lys. 2.24, 37, 40, 63; Pl. Menex. 240d; Arrington 2015, p. 107.  
82
 E.g. Aesch. Pers. 394; Soph. El. 26–8; Pl. Resp. 411c; Xen. Cyr. 4.2.11.  
83
 For such metaphors in Aristophanes see e.g. Thiercy 2003.  
84
 Pritchard 2013, p. 164–91; 2016, p. 62–5.   
85
 Balot 2014, p. 185, 191; Okál 1960, p. 108.  
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There “is no social restrictiveness here”: the ponoi of sailors no less than hoplites 
created the empire.86 Later in their interlude the chorus claim that their service as 
hoplites and as sailors greatly benefitted Athens (1075–100). For them what is “most 
painful” is “if someone who dodged the draft gulps down our pay, although he has not, 
for his country, taken up an oar, a spear or even a blister” (1117–19). Here Aristophanes 
made out that an Athenian could meet his martial duty by serving in either branch of 
the armed forces.     
 
5. Forensic and Deliberative Oratory 
 
 Old comedy’s positive depiction of naval matters parallels what we find in 
contemporaneous speeches. Athenian litigants always tried to win over non-elite jurors 
by listing the agatha (“benefits”) that they had given the state. When they could, such 
public speakers explained how they or their forebears had done agatha for the navy 
(e.g. Isoc. 16.18, 20–1; Lys.18.5–6). Politicians, too, made comparable arguments.87 
Both groups never missed the chance to say that their opponents had destroyed the 
shipsheds or, simply, warships.88 These speakers assumed, as Aristophanes did, that 
the dēmos viewed the navy’s maintenance as unambiguously good. In law-court 
speeches lists of agatha invariably mentioned military service.89 The dēmos made the 
trierarchy one of the liturgies that the wealthy were required to perform.90 As most 
litigants were wealthy, they often described what they had done as trireme-
commanders (e.g. Lys. 21.6–8; fr. 9c Todd). One speaker thus narrated the erga that 
he had performed as a trierarch after Athens’s final defeat in 405/4 (Isoc. 18.58–62). 
In recognition of them, he added, the dēmos had rewarded him for his aretē (65).     
Other law-court speeches detailed battles without reference to trierarchies. One 
defendant asked to be acquitted because he had “fought many sea battles for the state 
and many land battles” (Lys. 7.41). When there were no land battles, litigants simply 
listed the sea battles in which they had fought.91 In doing so one speaker characterised 
his risk taking in sea battles as courage (Lys. 21.24–5). All these lists depicted fighting 
at sea as no less of a benefit to the state than fighting on land.92 Litigants also attacked 
the service-records of their opponents. In a genuine prosecution speech against 
Andocides, for example, the speaker asked whether his service “as a courageous 
                                                          
86
 Quotation from Heath 1987, p. 39–40.    
87
 E.g. Andoc. 3.37, 39–40; Lys. 13.15–16, 46–7.   
88
 E.g. Lys. 12.38–40, 95, 99; 13.34, 46–7; 30.22.   
89
 Pernot 2015, p. 15-16.  
90
 E.g. Lys. 29.4; Amit 1965, p. 103.  
91
 E.g. Lys. 21.6–10, 24–5; 25.12–13; cf. Ar. Ran .693–702.  
92
 Kapellos 2014, p. 45 n. 299.  
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combatant” warranted his acquittal.93 It did not, the prosecutor argued, because this 
elite defendant had never campaigned “either as a horseman, a hoplite, a trierarch or a 
marine” ([Lys.] 6.46). Here it was assumed that aretē was not confined to hoplites and 
that military service could take different forms.    
This positive depiction of naval service was not limited to elite Athenians. In a 
law-court speech that he personally delivered Lysias gave aretē to the Athenian sailors 
of a battle in 406/5 (12.36). Later in the fourth century public speakers regularly did 
the same.94 In a speech from 399/8 the prosecutor asked whether the defendant, who, 
unusually, did not belong to the elite (Lys. 30.27–8), could be acquitted because “as a 
courageous man he had participated in many land battles and sea battles” (26). He 
could not, the prosecutor continued, because the defendant had stayed at home, while 
the non-elite jurors had faced dangers as sailors. Here the prosecutor assumed that non-
elite sailors displayed aretē, which he defined simply as the bearing of kindunoi. 
Litigants regularly spoke of sailors facing such dangers in sea battles (e.g. Lys. 19.20; 
21.7, 11, 24; 30.22). Because this was enough to meet the simplified definition of 
courage, these speakers were implying that sailors were courageous.   
 
6. Tragedy 
 
 Tragedy used the hoplite as a norm in four different ways. The sheer number of 
these uses set it apart from the other non-elite genres. Two of them matched what old 
comedy did. Tragedy likewise based generalisations about war on the hoplite (e.g. Eur. 
Bacch. 303–5; Soph. Phil. 1305–6). In Phoenician Women, for example, Euripides 
mentioned several different soldiers.95 In spite of this, his characters, when making 
generalisations, focussed only on one of them: the hoplite (e.g. 281–2, 705, 728, 824, 
1099). Jocasta thus described the battle’s outbreak as “touching the spear” and the 
enemy’s army as “the shield of the Argives” (78, 89). For Eteocles, Thebes’s king, 
battle was simply “the agōn (“contest”) of the spear” (780). Tragedy, too, made the 
hoplite the norm for gender roles.96 A famous example is Medea’s explanation why 
women have hard lives (Eur. Med. 248–51): “They say of us women that we live a life 
without danger, while they fight with the spear. They are badly mistaken. I would prefer 
to stand three times beside a shield than to give birth once.”     
                                                          
93
 [Lys.] 6.46. [Lys.] 6 may not have been written by Lysias, but the consensus, today, is that it 
was a genuine law-court speech (Todd 2007, p. 403–8).  
94
 E.g. Aeschin. 2.75; Dem. 2.24; 3.23–6; 4.3–4; 9.36, 40; 13.21–35; Lycurg. 1.68–70, 136; 
Balot 2014, p. 194; Pritchard 2015, p. 100; Roisman 2005, p.127 n. 69.   
95
 E.g. Eur. Phoen. 111–13, 139–40, 1072–4, 1095–6, 1141–3, 1189–92.    
96
 E.g. Eur. frs. 266; 282; 298; 360.23-5 Snell, Kannicht and Radt.  
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Yet the two other discursive uses to which tragedy put hoplites were unique. 
When tragedians described the military obligations of a citizen, they regularly focussed 
on such soldiers (e.g. Soph. Ant. 660–71). Aeschylus, for example, in his version of the 
Argive attack, made Eteocles explain that the Thebans must defend their motherland 
because she raised them “as aspidēphorous inhabitants” (Aesch. Sept. 10–20). 
Aspidēphoros (“shield-bearing”) is a common tragic neologism for a hoplite.97 This 
genre also defined aretē in terms of what he had to do in land battles.    
These tragic uses of the hoplite did not reflect general features of the popular 
culture that the dēmos shared.98 The hoplite was simply not the norm in the funeral 
oration and the other genres of public oratory. The comic poets shared the stage with 
tragedy, often made their characters talk like tragic ones and parodied specific 
tragedies.99 Therefore their use of the hoplite as a norm is, probably, best understood 
as another of their tragic appropriations. Yet old comedy still only appropriated half of 
tragedy’s uses of the hoplite. This extensive employment as a norm thus looks like a 
unique feature of tragedy. Today I would understand it as an important part of what P. 
Easterling describes as “heroic vagueness”. By this term Easterling means the “heroic 
setting” that the tragedians carefully created in order “to evoke a distinctively different 
world from that of the original audiences”.100 Getting this setting right was vitally 
important because tragedies were usually disturbing.101 Without such distance 
theatregoers found them hard to bear.102 Tragedy created this heroic world by 
reproducing some of its widely imagined features and avoiding jarring anachronisms.  
The dēmos apparently imagined heroic battles as little different from 
contemporary land battles; for the tragic poets explicitly called elite heroes “hoplites” 
and had them command armies of “hoplites”, who essentially fought as they did in 
classical times.103 In light of this equivalence, tragedy’s use of the hoplite as a norm 
simply reproduced the major features of Homer’s depiction of the elite heroes. In epic 
poetry heroes fought only in land battles and were the central figure for social 
differentiation. Aretē consisted of what they were required to do in battle. In order for 
the tragic hero, who was now a hoplite, to exhibit these epic features, he, along with 
                                                          
97
 E.g. Eur. Bacch. 781–4; Phoen. 1095–6; Supp. 390, 580.  
98
 Pace Pritchard 1998, p. 44-53.  
99
 E.g. Taplin 1983; Willi 2014, p. 180–2.  
100
 Easterling 1997, p. 21.  
101
 Easterling 1985, p. 1–-2, 5; 1997, p. 23.    
102
 E.g. Hdt. 6.21; Vernant 1988, p. 33–4.  
103
 For heroes as “hoplites” see e.g. Aesch. Sept. 466–7; Eur. Andr. 458–9; Heracl. 694, 696, 
699. For “hoplite” armies see e.g. Eur. Phoen. 584–5, 1096, 1191; cf. 659, 694-5, 702, 706–12. Eur. 
Heracl. 799–866 and Suppl. 650–730 described land battles that were essentially identical to 
contemporary ones (Lazenby 1991, p. 70).       
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his interlocutors, had to discuss war, the relations of different groups to it and the 
requirements of aretē only in hoplitic terms.104 These discussions often contained 
neologisms that were based on “spear” or “shield”. Homer had used a few examples of 
such compound words.105 Yet the fact that tragedians invented so many more suggests 
that this hoplitic idiom was an important means for creating the heroic setting.106  
Yet the discursive use of this soldier by the tragic poets did not prevent them from 
acknowledging Athenian seapower. This matches what we found in old comedy. Many 
tragedies concerned the sea voyages to and from Troy.107 These plays faithfully 
reproduced another epic feature: there were no Greek sea battles.108 Nevertheless they 
still described ordeals that contemporary Athenian sailors knew, landmarks that they 
had sailed passed and sea deities that classical Athens worshipped for the sake of their 
safety.109 Tragic poets made it easier for theatregoers to identify with all this by calling 
Agamemnon’s force a nautikos stratos or a nautikon strateuma.110 Both were common 
contemporary terms for a fleet.111 Tragedians also invented new myths about warships. 
In these tragedies the heroes may have sailed on old-fashioned penteconters.112 But the 
personnel on them were essentially the same as that of an Athenian trireme.113 
Tragedians even implied that Athens had always been a major naval power.114 On stage 
mythical Athenians praised their own seapower (e.g. Soph. OC 707–19). They were 
                                                          
104
 Gould 1983, p. 42.  
105
 E.g. Hom. Il. 2.131, 645, 650, 657, 840; 5.45, 72; 9.43; 11.334, 368, 401.  
106
 Examples include doruxenos (Aesch. Ag. 880; Cho. 562; Eur. Med. 687; Soph. OC 633), 
sunaspistēs (Soph. OC 379), aikhmalōtos (Aesch. Ag. 334, 1440; Eum. 400; Eur. El. 1008), 
doritmētos (Aesch. Cho. 347), dorusthenēs (160), doriponos (Aesch. Sept. 169; Eur. El. 479), 
dorussoos (Aesch. Supp. 182), dorilēptos (Eur. Hec. 478; Soph. Aj. 146, 894) and doripetēs (Eur. 
Andr. 653; Tro. 1003).  
107
 Pritchard 1998, p. 54.  
108
 But Euripides had mythical barbarians fight sea battles (Ion 1160; IT 1427, 1484–5; cf. Hel. 
1530–3).    
109
 For ordeals see e.g. Aesch. Ag. 193–5, 555–7, 649–80, 681–98; Eur. Hec. 35–9, 538–41, 
1289–92; IT 755–8; Soph. Phil. 121–9, 301–4, 542–55, 582–4, 639–44; cf. Aesch. Supp. 764–72; 
Eur. Hel. 1057-8. For landmarks see e.g. Eur. Hec. 1259–73; Thuc. 8.105.4; cf. Eur. IT 241, 393–4, 
422–6, 889–90; Hdt. 4.85. For sea deities see e.g. Eur. Hel. 1581–89, 1642–79; Thuc. 2.84.5; IG i3 
133; Parker 1996: 125; cf. Eur. El. 1238–59.  
110
 E.g. Aesch. Ag. 634, 986–7; Eur. IA 914, 1259; Soph. Phil. 58–9, 561–2; cf. Aesch. Supp. 
764.  
111
 See n. 76 above.   
112
 E.g. Eur. Hel. 1532–3; IT 1124. The Athenians replaced their penteconters with triremes in 
the 480s (Pritchard 2018a, p. 90).  
113
 Euripides put on his penteconters a kubernētēs, a keleustēs and an aulētēs (IT 1125–7, 1405; 
Hel. 1535–6, 1577–8, 1610–11, 1576, 1596 cf. Tro. 122–30). All three were standard petty officers 
in the Athenian navy (e.g. [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.2; IG i3 1032.35–46, 156–67; van Wees 2004, p. 210–
11). In IT Euripides also put archers on board (1377–8). A standard Athenian trireme had four of 
them (e.g. Thuc. 2.23.1–2; Pritchard 2018a, p. 90).    
114
 E.g. Aesch. Eum. 9–11; Eur. Hipp. 760–2; cf. Thuc. 1.93.3–7.  
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described as a people who had good naval skills (e.g. Aj. 356–8; cf. 202, 862). Athenian 
heroes commanded fleets.115 Athenian sailors could appear next to them.116 Tragedy 
thus reflected contemporary Athenian seapower in a wide variety of indirect ways. 
Athenian sailors, it seems, had succeeded in pushing themselves “into the magic circle 
of the Iliadic heroes”.117     
 In his Persians of 473/2 Aeschylus praised them directly.118 This historical 
tragedy notoriously reduced the Second Persian War to the battle of Salamis.119 Plataea 
thus became “an insignificant mopping-up operation”.120 The other battles were 
completely ignored. Aeschylus characterised Salamis as a naval victory of the 
Athenians.121 His battle-narrative attributed this success to the aretē of their sailors. As 
they were outnumbered four to one (Aesch. Pers. 337–43), Xerxes believed, initially, 
that they “would not remain (ou menoion)” but “would try to save their lives” (355–
60). Although a brave man, in both definitions of aretē, had to risk his life, the menō, 
here, shows that Aeschylus was using the hoplite-based one. The morning of the battle 
proved Persia’s king wrong; for, instead of running away, the Athenians advanced 
“with courageous daring” (384–95). Sailors struggled to meet the secondary 
requirement of this traditional definition of courage: individual erga. Aeschylus got 
around this in two ways. The first was to describe how individual triremes “struck” 
their opposite numbers.122 Collectively, at least, sailors had performed “great deeds”. 
The second way was to zoom in on moments when Athenian sailors had acted 
individually.123 Triremes-crews had done just this on Psyttaleia.124 Aeschylus 
emphasised how, after disembarking on this island, they gruesomely killed Persian 
soldiers in a land battle (447–64).    
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 E.g. Eur. IA 247–9; Soph. Phil. 561–2; cf. Eur. Hec. 118–24; Tro. 31.  
116
 Soph. Aj. 201–2, 245-50, 349, 972, 902, 1216–22.  
117
 Quotation from Mills 1997, p. 9.  
118
 Butera 2010, p.116–34; Grethlein 2010, p. 88; Hall 1996, p. 11–13.  
119
 Lattimore 1943, p. 91–2.   
120
 Aesch. Pers. 482–3, 490–-1, 803–8, 816–20. Quotation from Lattimore 1943, p. 91.  
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 For the emphasis on its naval dimension see e.g. Aesch. Pers. 353–432, 679–80, 728, 906, 
951–5, 962–6, 1011–12, 1029, 1037, 1075–6. On it being an Athenian victory see e.g. 233–4, 284–
5, 472–5, 355–60, 975–6; Hall 1993, p. 129.         
122
 E.g. Aesch. Pers. 336, 408–12, 417–18, 561–3, 906–7; Hall 1996, p. 22.     
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 E.g. Aesch. Pers. 424–6; Hall 1996, p. 19.  
124
 Rosenbloom 2006, p. 72–3.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
 In democratic Athens sailors had just as much prominence culturally as hoplites. 
The dēmos fully recognised that their state was a major seapower. They judged that it 
was vitally important to maintain their naval forces because Athens primarily waged 
war on the sea. In their eyes fighting as a sailor benefitted the state no less than fighting 
as a hoplite. Non-elite Athenians believed that a citizen equally met his martial duty by 
serving in the navy or the army. They insisted that Athenians fighting sea battles be 
equally recognised for their courage. Traditionally aretē had been defined in terms of 
what hoplites had to do in land battles. The way in which sailors fought was really 
different. Recognising them as courageous thus ran into the problem that they did not 
strictly meet a hoplite-based definition of aretē. Public speakers and playwrights got 
around this in two ways. Sometimes they emphasised those aspects of fighting at sea 
in which sailors met or, at least, came close to meeting the traditional criteria for 
courage.125 Yet more often than this they simply used a new definition of aretē. This 
defined courage as bearing battlefield dangers in spite of the personal risk. Because 
this simplified definition was no longer tied to the hoplite, sailors had no difficulty in 
meeting it. All this was very different from the negative view of sailors that the classical 
Athenians had inherited from their archaic forebears. In the military realm the dēmos 
had thus succeeded in redefining traditional aristocratic values.  
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